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Abstract
We report results from an incentivized laboratory experiment undertaken with the purpose
of providing controlled evidence on the causal effects of alcohol consumption on risk-taking,
time preferences and altruism. Our design disentangles the pharmacological effects of alco-
hol intoxication from those mediated by expectations, as we compare the behavior of three
groups of subjects: those who participated in an experiment with no reference to alcohol,
those who were exposed to the possibility of consuming alcohol but were given a placebo
and those who effectively consumed alcohol. All subjects participated in a series of eco-
nomic tasks administered in the same sequence across treatments. After controlling for
both the willingness to pay for an object and the potential misperception of probabilities as
elicited in the experiment, we detect no effect of alcohol in depleting subjects’ risk tolerance.
However, we find that alcohol intoxication increases impatience and makes subjects
less altruistic.
Introduction
There is a widespread consensus and social alarm about the potential costs of alcohol con-
sumption, especially alcohol abuse. Alcohol is perceived to enhance risky behaviors and impul-
sive decision-making, thereby increasing the likelihood of unpleasant consequences for the
consumer, as well as others with whom (s)he may come into contact. Traffic fatalities, gam-
bling disorders, detrimental health conditions and risky sexual behaviors are only a few exam-
ples of the risks associated with alcohol abuse. According to the Fact Sheet 2011 of the World
Health Organization “Alcohol is the world’s third largest risk factor for disease burden; it is the
leading risk factor in the Western Pacific and the Americas and the second largest in Europe.”
The literature in both social sciences and medicine is rich in empirical studies that investi-
gate the potential harmful behavioral consequences of alcohol consumption. Given its social
relevance, a precise assessment of the causal behavioral effects of alcohol intoxication is
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important for the purposes of policy-making. The present paper contributes to this flourishing
literature by reporting results from a laboratory experiment in which subjects participate in a
battery of incentivized economic decision tasks in the domains of risk-taking, time preferences,
optimism, value of money (willingness to pay for an object) and altruism (donations to social
projects).
In addition to providing novel evidence regarding the pharmacological effects of alcohol in-
toxication on relevant economic domains, by using a laboratory technique, our study addresses
important methodological issues. First, empirical studies of alcohol intoxication that are based
on field data, whether collected from directly observed behavior or from self-reported answers,
typically suffer from self-selection into the treatment, so they usually cannot identify the causal
effects of alcohol consumption. The same is true for studies of drinking and binge drinking
habits. Correlations between blood alcohol concentration and certain behavioral traits may re-
flect a true causal effect, but such correlations could also stem from variations in the propensity
to drink alcohol by individuals with specific traits. Our study significantly limits the extent of
the self-selection issue as participants to the experiment were recruited from the existing sub-
ject pool of the University of Milan; the only (weak) source of selection that remains in our de-
sign is due to the information in the inviting email about the possibility of consuming a
moderate quantity of alcohol during the experiment. Moreover, by relying on a laboratory ex-
periment that entails a random assignment to the treatment (alcohol), our analysis is able to
identify the causal link between alcohol consumption and economic behavior. Second, individ-
uals usually choose how much, when, where and with whom to drink alcoholic beverages at the
same time, so it is usually difficult to disentangle the effects of alcohol from those of the context
in which drinking takes place. Our results are instead free from the influence of the social envi-
ronment, at the price of a modest loss of external validity because the subject pool is composed
by students who volunteered to participate to the experiment. In this respect, there is a wide
agreement in the profession that the external validity of laboratory experiment is not an issue
when referred to the qualitative relationship between variables (see [1] and references therein).
External validity becomes a serious concern for experiment conducted under a policy-evalua-
tion perspective, i.e. aiming at providing a quantitative estimate of the relationship between
variables, but this is not the goal of our paper. Third, the behavioral effects of alcohol intoxica-
tion are also partly pharmacological and partly triggered by a psychological reaction to the sub-
jective perception of being under the influence of alcohol. Disentangling the two effects
requires independent variations of actual and perceived blood alcohol concentration, in a simi-
lar way as [2] did in order to show the significant role played by expectations in mediating pla-
cebo effects of caffeine.
In this respect, a distinctive feature of our experiment is that it isolates the pharmacological
effects of alcohol that are due to blood alcohol concentration from the psychological effects in-
duced by the subjective misperception of intoxication. The pharmacological effect is identified
by exploiting the variance between subjects who are treated with alcohol and those who receive
a placebo beverage with no alcoholic content but whose perception is appropriately confound-
ed. Our design also includes subjects who perform the same tasks as in the other two treat-
ments but with no reference to alcohol.
Concerning risk preferences, after controlling for optimism, willingness to pay and other in-
dividual controls, we detect only a marginal positive effect of alcohol intoxication on risk aver-
sion among female subjects. In contrast, we find a strong pharmacological effect of alcohol
consumption on time preferences, as it makes subjects more impatient. The pure impact of al-
cohol consumption on time preferences remains large even after controlling for subjective
measures of attitude toward risk, misperception of probabilities and willingness to pay. Finally,
our results suggest that alcohol intoxication makes subjects more selfish, as it significantly
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reduces donations to humanitarian causes to which sober subjects contribute more
substantial amounts.
Alcohol, Risk and Impatience
Social scientists have devoted substantial effort in analyzing the relationship between alcohol
consumption and risky behaviors in fields of investigation ranging from driving under the in-
fluence of alcohol and corresponding traffic fatalities [3, 4] to truancy and dropping our of
high-school [5–7], from detrimental labor productivity and labor market outcomes of young
adults [8] to health problems [9], and from risky sexual behavior [10, 11] to violent crimes
[12]. Most of these studies are based on survey data and provide useful indications about the
social costs associated with alcohol abuse.
A growing body of studies, based on the idea that (potentially) harmful behaviors are driven
by risk preferences among other things, have investigated at the individual level the link be-
tween alcohol consumption habits and attitude toward risk. [13, 14] and [15], among others,
show evidence of a significant correlation between risk aversion and alcohol consumption hab-
its, but they also warn against causal interpretations of their findings.
A few studies investigate in the field individual-level correlation between alcohol intoxica-
tion and risk preferences, with mixed results. [16] find that alcohol makes women more risk-
prone but that it has no effect on the risk propensity of male subjects. By contrast, [17] find
that females’ risk aversion increases with both measured and perceived alcohol concentration,
while only the latter has a positive correlation with males’ risk aversion. While field experi-
ments improve the external validity of the results, they do not solve the problem of self-selec-
tion into drinking habits. Moreover, they make it difficult to disentangle the pharmacological
impact of alcohol intoxication from context and peer effects [9, 18]. Peer effects have received
increasing attention in the literature on alcohol abuse and risky behaviors, with studies focus-
ing on the role played by fraternity membership [19, 20], social and family influence [21] and
exposure to the “wrong” kinds of friendships [22].
Laboratory experiments offer a way to limit the self-selection issue and identify the causal
effects of alcohol intoxication, but they have not yet provided conclusive results either. Some of
these studies [23–26] report no relation or mixed evidence of alcohol on individual risk atti-
tude, while others, such as [27], identify a positive pharmacological effect of acute alcohol in-
toxication on risk-taking. Laboratory experiments can also be used to disentangle the effects of
alcohol from those of the drinking context. For instance, by making social interactions salient
in their experimental design, [28] report that the positive effects of alcohol consumption on
risk-taking behaviors are stronger when subjects act individually than when they participate in
group decision-making.
There is also a growing literature that suggest that alcohol (and other substance) abuse
tends to induce impulsive decision-making. Impulsivity is commonly defined in the psycholog-
ical literature as the tendency to choose smaller and sooner rewards over larger and later ones,
although larger and later rewards are preferred when the decision is not made in the “heat of
the moment.” This form of preference reversal, which is usually explained in terms of hyper-
bolic discounting, has stimulated a large body of empirical research. Several studies have inves-
tigated whether substance abusers—and smokers in particular—are more impulsive than non
abusers, finding largely supportive evidence [29, 30]. However, once again, correlation does
not mean causality. On the one hand, subjects may become abuser because they are impatient,
as [31] suggests. [32] support this interpretation by studying the acute alcohol consumption of
subjects recruited in a pub. On the other hand, substance abuse may make subjects more impa-
tient. [33] claims that alcohol addicted subjects are characterized by a steeper discounting of
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delayed rewards and [34] find similar evidence among adolescents. [35] document that college
students who drink heavily discount hypothetical delayed rewards more steeply than light
drinkers do. [36] find higher discount rates among heroin and cocaine users but not among al-
coholics, as compared to controls. Again, controlled experiments are necessary to identify the
direction of the causal link between time-discounting and alcohol consumption.
However, even randomized experiments have yielded no clear-cut results. [37] find that in-
creased alcohol consumption leads to a counterintuitive increase in patience, whereas [38] find
no significant effect of alcohol consumption on time preferences. In contrast, [39] find that
subjects intoxicated at 0.8 g/kg performed more impulsively compared to the placebo in the Ex-
periential Discounting Task (EDT), while no significant difference emerges between subjects
intoxicated at 0.4 g/kg and the other two groups.
Methods: Experimental Design
The experimental protocol was approved by the ethical committee of the University of Milan.
The experiment involved voluntary students recruited using mailing list systems. The email
used to recruit subjects for the sessions with reference to alcohol (see below) announced that
the experiment could involve the consumption of a moderate quantity of alcohol. In this case,
we explained that volunteers must have consumed alcohol before without experiencing any
problems and that their physical and mental conditions did not advise against the consumption
of a moderate amount of alcohol. Participants in the session with reference to alcohol were also
reminded that they could withdraw from the study at any time. After having signed a consent
form, a medical doctor assessed participants by means of anamnesis and a cursory physical ex-
amination to determine that they were suitable for the experiment.
Our experimental study investigates the causal effects of alcohol consumption on individual
decision-making whereby we refer to individual decision-making as a situation in which strate-
gic interaction plays no role because the consequences of one’s choices have no effect on other
players. We compare results from two experiments: NO-ALC and ALC. In our benchmark, the
NO-ALC experiment, subjects took incentivized economic decisions without consuming or
hearing any reference to alcohol. The ALC experiment involved the same tasks as the bench-
mark, but before performing such tasks, subjects were required to drink a beverage, which they
knew could contain alcohol. Some participants chosen at random received an alcoholic bever-
age while the remaining subjects received a non-alcoholic drink that smelled like alcohol. Thus,
we distinguish among three treatments: the benchmark NO-ALC, whose subjects heard no ref-
erence to alcohol; the alcohol treatment ALC-T, whose subjects effectively consumed alcohol
before taking economic decisions; and the placebo group ALC-P, whose subjects who did not
consume alcohol but may have believed of being treated. We measured both actual and per-
ceived blood alcohol concentration at various stages of the experiment.
We collected data from 3 ALC sessions and 3 NO-ALC sessions. 39 subjects participated in
the ALC sessions and 38 subjects in the NO-ALC sessions, most of whom were undergraduate
students of Economics. The experiment took place at the University of Milan between March
and December 2011.
Procedures
Upon their arrival at the experimental laboratory, subjects drew a number that was used to link
them anonymously to final earnings. Once seated, subjects typed in their number into the com-
puter, and at the end of the experiment, they were paid using envelopes marked with their
numbers. The number was also used to assign subjects randomly to the two treatments, ALC-P
and ALC-T. Subjects were never told to which treatment they were assigned. In fact, no
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reference was made at all to the two treatments; it was only publicly announced to all subjects
in ALC that they would receive a beverage that might contain alcohol.
Before consuming the beverage, all participants were given a strong lozenge (“Fisherman’s
Friend”) to make detection of the drink’s alcohol content (or lack thereof) more difficult. Sub-
jects in ALC-T drank a mixture of peach juice and ethanol, with the amount of ethanol targeted
according to the tables released by the Italian Health Ministry to reach average intoxication
level of about 0.8 g/l, the legal limit for driving in several countries. Subjects in ALC-T received
an average of 0.8 ml of ethanol per kg of body weight (measured at the beginning of the experi-
ment), with the exact quantity varying between 0.67 ml/kg and 1 ml/kg, depending on gender,
recent food intake and drinking habits. Those in ALC-P drank peach juice with 5 ml of grappa
on the border of the glass and floated on the surface, a quantity that barely registers on a breath
alcohol test but that gave the glass the characteristic smell of an alcoholic beverages. Our ma-
nipulation was designed to minimize the differences in the perceived alcohol intoxication be-
tween subjects in ALC-T and ALC-P in a deception-free environment. As documented by our
descriptive statistics, it is difficult to grant equalization of subjects’ perception of alcohol intoxi-
cation between the two treatments. Nevertheless, the parametric analysis presented in the re-
sults accounts for this treatment heterogeneity and disentangles the pharmacological impact of
alcohol intoxication from the effects that can be attributed to subjects’mis-perception.
All participants were given 6 minutes to consume the beverage and were instructed to stop
drinking right away if they experienced any unpleasant effect. In the 30 minutes after drinking
—that is before alcohol consumption could alter their understanding of the tasks—one re-
searcher read aloud the instructions of the elicitation mechanism proposed by [40] (BDM here-
after; see the next section for details).
Immediately before starting their tasks, participants’ Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC)
was measured with a Lion500 professional alcoholmeter and results were never announced.
Subjects were also asked to self-report what they believed their intoxication level to be using
the same alcoholmeter scale. Overall, this process lasted about 15 minutes. Measured and per-
ceived BAC recorded in theMBAC and PBAC variables, respectively, allow us to identify both
the pharmacological and the indirect, expectation-mediated effects of alcohol consumption on
subjects’ economic decisions.
The NO-ALC experiment was identical to the ALC experiment, but for the removal of any
reference to alcohol. Subjects in the NO-ALC experiment did not consume any alcohol, and al-
cohol was never mentioned either in the recruiting email or during the experiment. To remove
any reference to possible intoxication, subjects in the NO-ALC experiment did not meet the
doctor for the anamnesis and the check, nor had their measured and perceived BAC recorded.
To minimize the difference in time between the two experiments, we implemented the same
BDM briefing stage in NO-ALC as in ALC. The two experimental designs coincided in all
other respects.
The Tasks
After the introductory phase in both ALC and NO-ALC, subjects took consecutive, non-strate-
gic economic decisions in the domains of attitude toward risk, willingness to pay for an object,
altruism, optimism and impatience. We retained the same order of economic decisions in all
experiments so any differences in behaviors between ALC and NO-ALC could be imputed
only to the alcoholic treatment. The tasks were computerized using z-Tree [41], a flexible com-
puter platform that is widely used in experimental economics to administer incentivized tasks
in networks. The choice of the tasks was made to cover a large spectrum of aspects of individual
decision-making studied in the economic literature. The tasks were implemented in an
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incentive-compatible way. Subjects were told that, although they were going to make several
economic decisions, their final payments would depend on a single task randomly selected at
the end of the experiment. In calibrating the parameters involved in the tasks, we made an ef-
fort to ensure that the potential earnings were comparable across tasks.
Phases 1, 2 and 6 were based on the BDM elicitation mechanism, an incentive-compatible
device used to elicit reservation prices. Under BDM, an individual reports a bid (ask) for an
item. Then, the item’s price is randomly drawn. If the bid (ask) is above (below) the price, the
subject receives (sells) the good and pays (receives) the drawn price. If the bid (ask) is below
(above) the price, the subject does not receive (sell) the good and pays (receives) nothing. The
detailed explanation of the BDMmechanism that was provided to the subjects and the English
instructions for the experimental tasks are included in the Supporting Information (see S1 Ex-
perimental Instructions). An important feature of BDM that makes this device useful for our
purposes is that it can be adapted easily to a variety of economic tasks.
Risk attitude (Phase 1). Wemeasured the subjects’ risk attitude by eliciting their ask
prices in a battery of 10 lotteries through the BDMmechanism. Lotteries entail the same events
(0-euro gain vs. 40-euro gain) with various probabilities of winning, ranging from 10% to
100%. Lotteries were presented in the same randomly prearranged order to reduce anchoring
effects that might induce risk neutrality. This elicitation method is not the most widely used,
and it has been criticized because of the high cognitive load required [42]. Although complexity
is definitely one of the most relevant dimensions along which the elicitation tasks should be
evaluated [43], the design of our experiment exposes subjects repeatedly to the BDMmecha-
nism, so the use of BDM to measure risk attitude implies no additional cognitive load at the
margin, which would have happened had we chosen another risk-elicitation method that re-
quired additional instructions (such as the task introduced by [44]). Moreover, as already men-
tioned, subjects were appropriately briefed in the introductory phase on how BDM works,
reducing the cognitive load. This task also has the advantage of allowing us to measure subjects’
risk attitude along the whole domain of probabilities. As a summary measure of risk attitudes,
we used the average difference between the expected value and the ask price (or selling price)
across all the lotteries. According to standard rational choice models of individual decision-
making, this variable—called Risk aversion hereafter—should be equal to zero, positive and
negative for risk-neutral, risk-averse and risk-loving individuals, respectively. One of our main
research questions concerns the effect of actual or perceived BAC on Risk aversion.
Willingness to pay (Phase 2). In this phase, subjects were endowed with 20 euro. We mea-
sured their willingness to pay for a radio-videogame using the BDM and recorded their bid
price. This variable—WTP hereafter—reflects the value (or marginal utility) that is subjectively
attributed to money, and should be distributed in the same way across random samples of the
population. The design of monetary incentives in experiments is usually based on the assump-
tion of constant marginal utility of money in order to keep incentives constant and identify the
causal effects of a treatment. In the context of our experiment, this assumption cannot be taken
for granted, as actual or perceived alcohol exposure could alter subjects’ willingness to spend
money, possibly threatening our ability to identify the causal effects of alcohol on our variables
of interest: altruism, risk and time preferences. It is thus important to control for differences in
WTP across treatments.
Altruism (Phases 3 and 4). In each of these two phases, subjects were endowed with 20
euro and were involved in a dictator game, in which they chose how much to donate (if any-
thing) to a non-governmental organization (NGO). The two phases differed in the selected
NGO: the humanitarian aid agency Mèdecins Sans Frontiéres (MSF) in one case and the non-
humanitarian Italian independent website of economic information LaVoce.info (LV) in the
other. We measured altruism as the amount donated to these two NGOs, respectively recorded
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in the Altruism MSF and Altruism LV variables. We investigate whether and how alcohol af-
fects altruism, particularly whether its effect on the propensity to make donations to the hu-
manitarian (MSF) and the non humanitarian (LV) causes differs. This analysis complements
the study of the effects of alcohol on risk and time preferences and extends it to
social preferences.
Optimism (Phase 5). We assessed subjects’ optimism by randomly extracting a sample of
21 covered cards out of a maze of 52 poker cards. Each participant drew one card from the ex-
tracted sample and were told that they would win 1 euro for each card in the sample that had
the same color as his or her card. Subjects then reported how many of the 21 cards they ex-
pected to be the same color as their own. Such beliefs, captured by a variable called Optimism,
were elicited in an incentive compatible way by assigning a prize of 10 euro if they turned out
to be correct. Due to the random selection draw, the expected value is that the drawn sample
contains 10.5 cards of any color, so higher levels of Optimism reflect an optimistic view of one’s
chances of earning money. This task offers an important control for the study of the effects of
alcohol on risk attitude, as, if alcohol exposure alters the perception of probabilities, the actual
or perceived alcohol intoxication could modify subjects’ propensity to make risky choices—not
because of a change in risk preferences, but because of a change in optimism about the likely
consequences. The variable Optimism allows us to control for this possibility.
Impatience (Phase 6). In this phase, each subject was given a cash card in which the ex-
perimenters would transfer 20 euro one hour after the end of the experiment. We measured
participants’ impatience by asking them how much money they would require in order to post-
pone the money transfer by one, seven, and eight days. Such requests, recorded as One day,
Seven days and Eight days, respectively, were made incentive-compatible through the BDM
mechanism. The use of a cash card allowed us to measure subjects time preferences by cleanly
controlling for trust and transfer costs. We chose to implement the impatience task at the end
of the experiment to enhance the salience of postponing the receipt of money by minimizing
the time between the task and the final payments.
Debriefing
The data-collection phase lasted about 30 minutes and finished with subjects filling in an anon-
ymous questionnaire to gather demographic and socio-economic information and some self-
reported measures of happiness and trust. Following data collection, participants in ALC had
their measured and perceived BAC recorded for the second time (MBAC2 and PBAC2), with
subjects still unaware of the result of the first measure (MBAC and PBAC). Individual payoffs
were then determined according to the specific rules of the phase randomly drawn for payment
in each session. Participants in ALC who had a measured BAC above 0.5 g/l were invited to re-
main in the laboratory until their BAC decreased below the legal limit allowed to drive in Italy,
and we suspended the payment until that time. Before they left the laboratory, all subjects were
asked to sign a statement that declared that they felt physically and mentally comfortable and
that they perceived no impairment following their participation in the experiment. Fig. 1 sum-
marizes the timing of the experiment.
Results
On average, subjects earned 13.85 euros in sessions that lasted about 90 minutes in the case of
ALC and 70 minutes in the case of NO-ALC sessions. Table 1 presents the summary statistics
for age, gender, and performance in the various tasks for ALC-T, ALC-P, and
NO-ALC, separately.
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Measured and Perceived BAC
The differences in BAC induced by the random allocation of subjects in ALC to the alcohol
(ALC-T) and placebo (ALC-P) treatments are shown in Table 2, which presents—by
treatment—the summary statistics of measured and perceived BAC at the first (MBAC and
PBAC) and second (MBAC2 and PBAC2) recording. The table also displays summary statistics
for misperceived BAC, defined as the difference between perceived and measured BAC, at the
two recording times (i.e.,MPBAC = PBAC −MBAC andMPBAC2 = PBAC2 −MBAC2). This
variable captures the belief that one is intoxicated that is not backed by actual BAC. For in-
stance, a value ofMPBAC> 0 indicates that the subject overestimates her or his intoxication
level. Misperceived BAC is used as a measure for the placebo effect of alcohol.
As no specific reference to alcohol is made in the NO-ALC experiment, we set bothMBAC
andMPBACmeasures equal to zero for these participants. We useMBAC andMPBAC, along
with a dummy for the NO-ALC experiment, called NO-ALC, as our main explanatory vari-
ables. This approach is preferable to the alternative of usingMBAC and PBAC (always with the
NO-ALC dummy), because, although statistically equivalent, it allows disentangling the phar-
macological and the placebo effect of alcohol in a cleaner way. At the same time, it also allows
recovering the significance of the effect of perceived intoxication through simple
econometric tests.
Fig 1. Timeline of the Experiment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121530.g001
Table 1. Summary Statistics.
Treatment ALC-T (20 Obs) ALC-P (19 Obs) NO-ALC (38 Obs)
Variable Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max
Age 23.2 2.191 20 30 23.053 1.649 21 27 24.605 5.38 19 45
Female .4 .503 0 1 .263 .452 0 1 .579 .5 0 1
WTP 3.145 3.852 0 12 3.916 4.531 0 18.8 7.029 4.941 0 20
Optimism 10.55 1.701 7 13 10.789 2.371 6 13 11.711 2.779 8 21
Risk aversion 1.636 7.078 -8.5 19.1 .592 4.218 -9.3 8.5 1.536 5.251 -4.2 17.6
One day 7.475 7.236 .5 20 4.342 3.87 0 13 5.403 5.592 0 20
Seven days 11.125 6.011 2.5 20 7.839 4.511 0 17 8.388 5.837 0 20
Eight days 13.095 6.272 3 20 9.742 5.547 0 20 9.618 6.582 0 20
Donation MSF 4.645 5.009 0 15 7.184 6.176 0 20 9.5 5.831 0 20
Donation LV 2.8 4.053 0 15 2.395 2.313 0 6 4.982 4.022 0 15
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121530.t001
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At both recording times, perceived and measured BAC are significantly higher in ALC-T
than in ALC-P. A Mann-Whitney test rejects the null hypothesis that bothMBAC and PBAC
are equal in the two treatments (p< 0.0001 and p = 0.0009, respectively). An analogous test for
MBAC2 and PBAC2 rejects equality between the two treatments with p< 0.0001 and
p = 0.0018, respectively. At the first recording, before performing the incentivized tasks, sub-
jects in both treatments tend to overestimate their intoxication level, as the average PBAC is
significantly higher thanMBAC. At the second recording, after performing the tasks, subjects
in both treatments revise their perceived BAC downwards. In ALC-T, the revision in percep-
tion substantially overestimates the objective decrease in measured BAC, with PBAC2 becom-
ing lower thanMBAC2 on average. In ALC-P, the perceived BAC remains high even though
subjects did not actually consume alcohol. Fig. 2 shows the distribution of the first recording of
measured and perceived BAC for the ALC-T subjects.
At both recording times,MPBAC is significantly higher in ALC-P than in ALC-T. A Mann-
Whitney test rejects the null hypothesis thatMPBAC is equal in the two treatments with
Table 2. Measured and Perceived BAC by Treatment.
Treatment ALC-T (20 Obs) ALC-P (19 Obs)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
MBAC .596 .159 .32 .91 .017 .03 0 .08
MBAC2 .557 .114 .32 .77 .01 .024 0 .07
PBAC .715 .319 .2 1.5 .369 .246 0 .8
PBAC2 .493 .218 .09 1 .241 .214 0 .65
MPBAC .119 .32 -.38 .75 .352 .234 0 .74
MPBAC2 -.064 .235 -.47 .63 .231 .209 0 .6
Notes: These variables are equal to zero by construction in the NO-ALC treatment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121530.t002
Fig 2. Measured and Perceived Alcohol Concentration of the treated.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121530.g002
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p = 0.0064 (forMPBAC2 equality is rejected with p< 0.0001). Fig. 3 shows the distribution of
MPBAC in the two ALC conditions. Our design has been effective in inducing among the par-
ticipants in ALC-P the belief that they had consumed alcohol. This offers a good basis on
which to identify the pharmacological and placebo effects of alcohol, since the design reduces
the strongly positive correlation between perceived and actual alcohol intake that would have
been observed otherwise.
Since perceived BAC at the second recording may be endogenous to performance in the ex-
periment, we base our analysis on the first recording. We have also run all the regressions with
BAC measures from the second recording, obtaining results that are highly aligned because of
the high correlation between the two recording times (0.978 forMBAC andMBAC2, 0.918 for
PBAC and PBAC2; these results are available upon request but are not included here because
the endogeneity issue renders them less interpretable).
We have also run all the regressions using ALC-T (a dummy for the alcohol treatment) and
NO-ALC as the main explanatory variables (in place ofMBAC,MPBAC and NO-ALC). We
refer to this analysis as to treatment dummy regressions. While disregarding information on
the intensive margin of alcohol intoxication results in a slight loss of explanatory power and
precision, it allows a clearcut comparison of the different treatments. Results, which confirm
those obtained exploiting the intensive margin of intoxication, are not reported in detail for the
sake of space, although we refer to them whenever useful. Since the excluded dummy is the one
for the placebo treatment, ALC-P, the coefficient of ALC-Tmeasures the differential impact
(on each dependent variable) of the alcohol treatment relative to the placebo, whereas the coef-
ficient of NO-ALC captures the differential impact between the placebo and no-alcohol treat-
ment, that is, they capture the pharmacological and placebo effects of alcohol, respectively.
These results are included in the Supporting Information (see S1 Additional Regressions).
Fig 3. Misperception of Blood Alcohol Concentration (MPBAC).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121530.g003
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Alcohol, Monetary Incentives and Optimism
Before looking at the effects of alcohol on risk-taking, time preferences and altruism, it is worth
considering its impact onWTP and Optimism, which will be used as controls in the
subsequent analysis.
The comparatively large monetary incentives involved in the experiment contribute to the
methodological validity of our design. Nevertheless, the assumption that subjects who differ in
terms of their alcohol consumption perceive monetary incentives in the same way cannot be
taken for granted. To determine whether subjects with higher BAC (measured or perceived)
value money differently from subjects with lower or no alcohol exposure, we compare the sub-
jects willingness to pay for a given object (a radio-videogame) in Phase 2 of the experiment.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 show the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates from a line-
ar model in which the willingness to pay,WTP, is regressed againstMBAC,MPBAC and
NO-ALC, first without and then with additional exogenous individual controls.
It emerges that subjects are significantly more willing to pay for the objects when no refer-
ence is made to alcohol. A possible interpretation of this result is that, in the NO-ALC condi-
tion, subjects do not bear the risk of consuming alcohol, so they may consider the experiment
as requiring less effort than their counterparts in the ALC treatments might. Consequently
they could dispose more easily of their money because they perceive it as windfall gains. This
interpretation is also consistent with the findings about altruism reported below. An alternative
explanation is that exposure to alcohol triggers self-control mechanisms on expenditures. In
turn, when participants are exposed to alcohol consumption (ALC), differences inMBAC and
inMPBAC do not translate into significant differences in how the participants value money.
These results are confirmed by non-parametric analysis. A Mann-Whitney test rejects the null
hypothesis that the averageWTP is the same for NO-ALC and ALC (p = 0.0007) and for
Table 3. Alcohol, Value of Money and Optimism.
Dependent variable WTP WTP Optimism Optimism
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MBAC -.3290 -.4036 -.7282 -.6894
(1.0257) (.8093) (.6841) (.8120)
MPBAC .0307 .6089 -1.9665** -1.5074
(1.0340) (.9757) (.7989) (.9584)
NO-ALC 3.4119** 3.1607* .3581 .4168
(1.5996) (1.6485) (.5163) (.6322)
Age .0499 -.0878***
(.0874) (.0215)
Female 1.1739* .7731
(.6944) (.5509)
Constant 3.6168*** 1.9608 11.3524*** 13.0064***
(1.2890) (2.6524) (.4891) (.8498)
Observations 77 77 77 77
R-Square .132 .1477 .0691 .1065
Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2), WTP, is the willingness to pay for the object in Phase 2 of the experiment; the
dependent variable in columns (3) and (4), Optimism, is the expected gain in the card game (elicited in Phase 5). MBAC is the measured level of Blood
Alcohol Concentration (BAC), MPBAC is the difference between perceived and measured BAC, NO-ALC is a dummy for the NO-ALC experiment. Age is
respondents’ age (in years) and Female is a gender dummy. Significance level (***: 1%; **: 5%; *: 10%) based on robust standard errors (reported in
parenthesis), clustered at the experimental session level (8 clusters).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121530.t003
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NO-ALC and ALC-P (p = 0.0101), whereas equality between ALC-T and ALC-P cannot be re-
jected (p = 0.4561). Once controlling for age and gender, treatment dummy regressions show
no significant effect of alcohol onWTP, whether pharmacological or placebo. While this result
is already reassuring for the validity of the comparison between subjects in treatments ALC-T
and ALC-P, we always control for individualWTP in the regression analysis below, finding
that it is never significant and its inclusion never alters the sign, the magnitude, or the signifi-
cance of the effects of alcohol.
It is also worth noting that the variance ofWTP is lower in ALC-T than in the other treat-
ments (see Table 1). This suggests that the levels of alcohol intoxication observed in the experi-
ment neither introduce additional noise to subjects’ choices nor impair their ability to make
rational choices. Again, this results reassuring for the possibility of interpreting subsequent re-
sults within the rational choice framework.
The assessment of the effects of alcohol on risk aversion also relies on the assumption that
alcohol does not alter the perception of probabilities (in particular, perception of the odds of
winning). We investigate the validity of this assumption by observing the effects of alcohol in-
toxication on subjects optimism, as elicited in Phase 5. If alcohol affects optimism, the analysis
of risk aversion should control for this effect, just as it is important to control for the value
of money.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 show OLS estimates of Optimism regressed against the same
set of controls used in the first two columns. While there is some evidence of a placebo effect,
with subjects who overestimate their BAC expressing more pessimistic guesses, such evidence
is not robust to the introduction of controls. Non-parametric analysis confirms the absence of
any difference in Optimism across treatments. A Mann-Whitney test cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis that Optimism is the same for ALC-T and ALC-P (p = 0.3615), for NO-ALC and
ALC-P (p = 0.5138), and for NO-ALC and ALC-T (p = 0.1606). Once controlling for age and
gender, treatment dummy regressions show no significant effect of alcohol on Optimism,
whether pharmacological or placebo.
Alcohol and Risk Preferences
We use the selling (ask) price of the lotteries elicited through the BDM procedure in Phase 1 to
measure subjects attitude toward risk. A risk-neutral agent should evaluate any lottery exactly
at its expected value, while risk-averse (risk-loving) agents should instead ask lower (higher)
prices. For each individual, we use as a summary measure of Risk aversion the average differ-
ence, across the ten lotteries, between the expected value and the selling price. On average, ex-
perimental subjects have a slight degree of risk aversion, with the average expected value and
selling price of 22 euro and 20.66 euro, respectively. The average amount that subjects are will-
ing to forgo to avoid the risk associated with lotteries is 1.34 euro, that is, 6% of expected gains.
As shown in Table 1, there are only minor differences across treatments: the average Risk
aversion is 1.64, 0.59, and 1.54, respectively, that is 7.4%, 2.7%, and 7% of expected gains.
Therefore, unlike what has been observed in several other lab experiments, our subjects have
preferences that are, on average, close to risk neutrality, which is in line with Rabin’s calibration
theorem [45].
The selling price tends to be lower than the expected value particularly in the lotteries with
high probabilities of winning, as shown in Fig. 4. The pattern around the expected value of the
lotteries is consistent with the estimated shape of the probability-weighting function [46].
Our key research question concerns whether risk attitude is affected by alcohol intoxication
and whether it changes across the experimental treatments. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4
show the OLS estimates of Risk aversion regressed against the same set of controls used in
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Fig 4. Average certainty equivalent (selling price) by lottery.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121530.g004
Table 4. Alcohol and Risk Preferences.
Dependent variable Risk aversion Risk aversion Risk aversion
(1) (2) (3)
MBAC -.2790 -.2739 .0316
(1.6759) (1.9600) (2.2376)
MPBAC -2.7993 -1.0813 -.7754
(3.1056) (2.9742) (2.8707)
NO-ALC -.3298 -.4787 -1.3713
(1.7146) (1.9179) (1.4418)
Age -.1467 -.1324
(.1295) (.0896)
Female 3.1197*** 2.6021**
(.8948) (1.1566)
WTP .2427
(.1502)
Optimism .3010
(.4116)
Constant 1.8654* 3.8177 -.5727
(1.0368) (3.3130) (3.5742)
Observations 77 77 77
R-Square .0122 .0888 .1452
Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable, Risk aversion, is the average difference between the
expected value and the ask price across the ten lotteries elicited in Phase 1 of the experiment. Regressors
are defined in the notes to Table 3. Significance level (***: 1%; **: 5%; *: 10%) based on robust standard
errors (reported in parenthesis), clustered at the experimental session level (8 clusters).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121530.t004
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Table 3—that is, the treatment variablesMBAC,MPBAC and NO-ALC—first without the exog-
enous individual controls Age and Female, and then with them. Common wisdom might sug-
gest that alcohol increases risk-seeking behavior, but our multivariate framework contradicts
this conjecture, as no treatment variable is significantly related to Risk aversion. The same is
true for perceived BAC, which is simply PBAC =MBAC+MPBAC: a Wald test cannot reject
the null hypothesis thatMBAC+MPBAC = 0 (p> 0.5 in all specifications). Females appear to
have a significantly higher degree of risk aversion than males do. Column (3) adds individual
controls for the marginal utility of money and for optimism: the coefficients ofWTP and Opti-
mism are not significantly different from zero and their inclusion does not alter the previous re-
sults. Treatment dummy regressions confirm that there is no significant effect of alcohol on
Risk aversion, whether pharmacological or placebo.
Table 5 splits the average Risk aversion by gender and treatment, showing how the gender
effect on risk attitudes is mediated by alcohol intoxication. In the NO-ALC and ALC-P treat-
ments—that involved no alcohol consumption—the choices made by males and females are
similar on average and not far from those associated with risk neutrality. By contrast, in
ALC-T, where participants do consume alcohol, the behavior diverges sharply: while males
have slightly risk-seeking preferences, females’ risk aversion increases dramatically, as they are
willing to give up almost 30% of the expected gain to avoid uncertainty.
Splitting the sample along two dimensions (treatment and gender) results in a further re-
duction in the number of observations from which to make inferences. For this reason, most of
the comparisons by treatment and gender are not significant, with the remarkable exception of
the gender differences in risk aversion in the ALC-T condition (p = 0.0370). A similar argu-
ment applies when interacting gender with measured and misperceived BAC (MBAC and
MPBAC) in a multivariate framework. The level of measured alcohol intoxication is positively
associated with risk aversion, with this effect being marginally significant for females and not
significant for males; for the sake of space, this result is not reported, but it is available upon re-
quest. Therefore, what emerges is a gender-specific compensation effect, with only intoxicated
female subjects compensating for the detrimental effects of alcohol by displaying more prudent
behavior. This finding is in line with [47], who also detect a compensation effect for females in
a cognitive task. Similar risk attitudes emerge for subjects who are not exposed to alcohol con-
sumption (NO-ALC and ALC-P), which is consistent with the recent findings of [48], who
argue that gender differences are usually not observed with elicitation methods that are charac-
terized by changing probabilities and the absence of a riskless alternative like the BDM.
Alcohol and Time Preferences
One day, Seven days and Eight days refer to the additional sums required to postpone payment
by the respective number of days (elicited in Phase 6 of the experiment). Fig. 5, 6, and 7 show
the distribution of these variables across the different treatments, showing that alcohol con-
sumption makes individuals more impatient. In fact, the distribution of premiums requested
by subjects in the in ALC-T treatment at seven and eight days stochastically dominates that of
Table 5. Risk aversion by Treatment and Gender.
Treatment Males Females
NO-ALC .77 2.10
ALC-P .29 1.44
ALC-T -1.49 6.32
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121530.t005
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Fig 5. Distribution of additional sum required to postpone payment by one day.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121530.g005
Fig 6. Distribution of additional sum required to postpone payment by seven days.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121530.g006
Economic Behavior under the Influence of Alcohol
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0121530 April 8, 2015 15 / 25
those in the ALC-P and NO-ALC treatments. This result is confirmed by non-parametric anal-
ysis. At any future date, the average delay premium is higher in ALC-T than in ALC-P, with
their difference being significant at seven and eight days. In particular, a battery of Mann-
Whitney tests marginally rejects the null hypothesis that the average of Seven days is the same
for ALC-T and ALC-P (p = 0.0984), and the same is true for Eight days (p = 0.0985). By con-
trast, the same tests cannot reject equality of these variables between NO-ALC and ALC-P
(p = 0.9323 and p = 0.8653, respectively), nor can they reject equality of One day between
ALC-T and ALC-P (p = 0.1846).
Our data can be used to calculate individual discount factors (relative to the present) at dif-
ferent points in time. Assuming that individual utility is linear in income and additively separa-
ble in time, the present discounted utility of a stream of income y = (y0, . . ., yT), from time 0 to
T, can be expressed as UðyÞ ¼PTt¼0 btyt . The assumption of constant marginal instantaneous
utility of money is common in the literature, and it is a plausible approximation in light of the
small degree of risk aversion we find in the data. In any case, to account for possible deviations
from risk neutrality, we include individual risk aversion among the controls in later regression
analysis. Multiplying discounted utility by a constant to rescale from monetary to utility units
is irrelevant for choice, so it is omitted. Standard neoclassical economics assumes exponential
discounting: βt = β
t, for some β 2 (0, 1). This functional specification implies that the ratio be-
tween the discount factors of two adjacent moments in time is always constant: for any t, βt+1/
βt = β. Rational individuals who discount the future exponentially should make time-consistent
choices. Behavioral economists have often explained the abundant evidence of time-inconsis-
tent choices based on the idea that the discount factor is a hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic (rath-
er than exponential) function of time, which means that βt drops faster from one period to the
next when the present is near (t is close to zero) than when it is not (t is high). Our experiment
Fig 7. Distribution of additional sum required to postpone payment by eight days.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121530.g007
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allows exponential versus hyperbolic discounting to be tested. Since we have data for t 2 {0, 1,
7, 8}, and since β0 = 1 by construction such that β1/β0 = β1, we test the null hypothesis that β1 =
β8/β7 against the alternative that β1< β8/β7. We find that β1 = 0.8108 and β8/β7 = 0.9589. The
null hypothesis that they are equal is rejected by a t-test at the 1% significance level in both the
full sample and the subsamples that correspond to each treatment, suggesting that our subjects
discount the future in a hyperbolic-like way, rather than an exponential way (or a current dis-
cussion of the literature on hyperbolic discounting and for an alternative interpretation in
terms of subjective time compression, see [49]).
To continue in our investigation of the effects of alcohol on time preferences, we construct a
panel using as the longitudinal dimension the individual discount factor at several points in
time (relative to the present). Thus, we define the variable Patience, which includes four obser-
vations for each individual, calculated as follows: β0 is set equal to one by construction, whereas
for t 2 {1, 7, 8}, βt = 20/yt, where yt is the overall amount received at time t (20 euros plus the
amount required to postpone the payment at each future date), as elicited in Phase 6 of
the experiment.
The experimental design is structured so that rational and risk-neutral agents ask for overall
future sums yt, whose present discounted value is equal to the current payment, which is 20
euros: βt yt = 20. The panel structure of our dataset allows us to run a random effect estimation
of the longitudinal variable Patience against the main regressors (MBAC,MPBAC and
NO-ALC, which are longitudinally constant for each individual) and a number of additional
controls. Results are shown in Table 6 in which standard errors are clustered at the subject
level in order to take into account the dependence of the three choices made at 1, 7, and 8 days.
Column (1), which considers only the main determinants of interest, confirms that alcohol
consumption raises impatience, i.e it reduces Patience, both through a (significant) pharmaco-
logical effect and through a (non significant) placebo effect. A Wald test rejects the null hy-
pothesisMBAC+MPBAC = 0 at the 5% significance level. This result, which remains true
throughout the different specifications from column (1) to (4), means that perceived alcohol
intoxication is negatively and significantly associated to Patience. Table 6 disentangles the ef-
fect of perception (PBAC) into that of its two virtually orthogonal components, namely mea-
sured alcohol intoxication (MBAC) and its misperception (MPBAC), and shows that only the
former significantly explains variations in impatience.
Column (2) exploits the longitudinal dimension and introduces three time dummies for fu-
ture dates, 1D, 7D and 8D, corresponding to one, seven and eight days from the date of the ex-
periment, respectively. While introducing these dummies does not affect the results on the
effects of alcohol, it confirms the result on the hyperbolic shape of time-discounting. Contrary
to the constant discount rate predicted by exponential discounting, postponing the payment by
one day makes the discount factor drop faster when it takes place at present than it does if it
takes place in seven days. As shown by Column (3), results are essentially unaffected by the in-
troduction of additional (exogenous) individual controls.
Column (4) introduces our experimental measures of willingness to pay, risk aversion, and
optimism, showing that Patience is significantly and positively correlated with Risk aversion,
but it is not significantly associated with the other two variables. The positive sign of Risk aver-
sion’s coefficient supports the claim that risk-loving subjects are also more impatient, a combi-
nation that may favor their involvement in risky behaviors. The significant correlation between
impatience and attitude toward risk is also reassuring for the goodness of our measure of risk
aversion, supporting the absence of alcohol’s effects in increasing risk-taking as a genuine re-
sult. Alcohol does not affect the interplay between risk tolerance and impatience, as shown by
the fact that the coefficient of the interaction between risk aversion and the intoxication level is
fairly close to zero (results are not reported to save space but are available upon request).
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Table 6. Alcohol and Time Discounting, Panel.
Dependent variable Patience Patience Patience Patience Patience Patience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MBAC -.1084** -.1084** -.1066** -.1034**
(.0476) (.0478) (.0478) (.0442)
MPBAC -.0842 -.0842 -.0807 -.0709 -.0615
(.0519) (.0521) (.0550) (.0582) (.0544)
NO-ALC -.0296 -.0296 -.0254 -.0235 -.0148 -.0138
(.0317) (.0318) (.0319) (.0310) (.0227) (.0195)
1D -.1892*** -.1892*** -.1892*** -.1759*** -.1698***
(.0170) (.0171) (.0171) (.0185) (.0213)
7D -.2835*** -.2835*** -.2835*** -.2659*** -.2572***
(.0158) (.0159) (.0160) (.0184) (.0204)
8D -.3150*** -.3150*** -.3150*** -.2935*** -.2816***
(.0174) (.0174) (.0175) (.0206) (.0225)
Age -.0025 -.0015 -.0015 -.0015
(.0039) (.0037) (.0037) (.0037)
Female .0035 -.0155 -.0157 -.0152
(.0232) (.0221) (.0222) (.0215)
WTP -.00008 -.00006 -.00007
(.0019) (.0019) (.0019)
Risk aversion .0055*** .0055*** .0055***
(.0019) (.0019) (.0019)
Optimism .0025 .0026 .0027
(.0057) (.0057) (.0056)
MBAC*1D -.0834 -.0832
(.0637) (.0632)
MBAC*7D -.1104** -.1107**
(.0501) (.0490)
MBAC*8D -.1350*** -.1359***
(.0506) (.0486)
MPBAC*1D -.0522
(.0730)
MPBAC*7D -.0734
(.0608)
MPBAC*8D -.1001
(.0668)
Constant .8448*** 1.0418*** 1.0978*** 1.0440*** 1.0216*** 1.0133***
(.0269) (.0258) (.0915) (.1157) (.1138) (.1112)
Observations 308 308 308 308 308 308
Overall R-Square .022 .5121 .5154 .5448 .5495 .5519
Notes: Random effect panel estimate. The dependent variable, Patience, is the discount factor at different dates (set equal to one for the present and
measured in one, seven and eight days by the ratio of the present payment –20 euros– to the total amount required to postpone payment at each future
date, as elicited in Phase 6 of the experiment), constructed as a longitudinal variable with four observations for each individual. 1D, 7D and 8D are
dummies for the respective future dates. MBAC*1D, MBAC*7D and MBAC*8D, and MPBAC*1D, MPBAC*7D and MPBAC*8D, are interaction terms
between these dummies and MBAC and MPBAC, respectively. The other regressors are defined in the notes to Table 3 and Table 4. Significance level
(***: 1%; **: 5%; *: 10%) based on robust standard errors (reported in parenthesis), clustered at the individual level (77 clusters).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121530.t006
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Column (5) introduces three interaction terms betweenMBAC and the time dummies
(MBAC1D,MBAC7D andMBAC8D), in order to determine whether the pharmacological
effect of alcohol on the time discount factor varies across future dates. The results suggest that,
relative to the present, subjects with high measured BAC do not discount a one-day payment
postponement differently from other subjects, but they discount a seven- or eight-day post-
ponement significantly more than other subjects do.
In order to conduct a similar analysis about the differential effects of alcohol misperception,
Column (6) adds three interaction terms betweenMPBAC and the time dummies
(MPBAC1D,MPBAC7D andMPBAC8D), but none of them is significant, suggesting that
the overestimation of one’s alcohol intoxication does not significantly raise impatience. As a
robustness check we replicated the analysis in Table 6 in a cross-section framework using a
summary measure for subjective impatience, namely the Area-Under-the-Curve (AUC) of the
three choices, as dependent variable. Results (included in S1 Additional Regressions) confirm a
positive and highly significant relationship between impatience, measured by AUC, and alco-
hol intoxication. Treatment dummy regressions confirm the results of both panel and cross-
sectional analysis, showing a significant pharmacological effect of alcohol (which makes sub-
jects more impatient), but no significant placebo effect.
Alcohol and Altruistic Preferences
Phases 3 and 4 of the experiment assess the effect of alcohol on altruism. The descriptive statis-
tics in Table 1 reveal two main observations. First, donations to the humanitarian group MSF
are substantially higher than those made to the non-humanitarian group LV in the ALC-P and
NO-ALC treatments (p = 0.0068 and p = 0.0002, respectively, according to Mann-Whitney
tests), but not in the ALC-T treatment (p = 0.3122). Second, overall donations made by subjects
in the NO-ALC group are systematically higher than those made by subjects in the ALC treat-
ments. Such differences reach conventional significance levels according to a battery of Mann-
Whitney tests, with the exception of the donations to MSF in the ALC-P and NO-ALC treat-
ments (p = 0.1664). More specifically, the p-values is 0.0025 for donations to MSF comparing
ALC-T and NO-ALC. As far as donations to LV are concerned, p-values are 0.0120 (NO-ALC
vs. ALC-T) and 0.0232 (NO-ALC vs. ALC-P), respectively.
Table 7 reports random-effect estimates from a panel model that uses the amounts each in-
dividual donated to the two NGOs as a longitudinal variable, Altruism, with standard errors
clustered at the individual level.
Column (1) confirms that donations are higher in the NO-ALC group, but the difference is
not statistically significant. The ALC experiment shows a negative association of donations
with bothMBAC andMPBAC, but again the coefficients are not significantly different from
zero. Column (2) adds a project dummy for MSF, confirming that experimental subjects are
significantly and substantially more willing to donate to MSF than to LV. Controlling for age
and gender (Column 3) confirms the previous results and shows that donations are significant-
ly higher for older subjects and for females, a result that is common in the literature. Including
subjects’ willingness to pay as an additional explanatory variable (Column 4) does not change
the results.
To qualify the previous results, the last two columns of Table 7 introduce the interaction
terms between measured and misperceived BAC on the one hand, and theMSF and LV dum-
mies on the other hand. While alcohol does not significantly alter donations to LV, it signifi-
cantly reduces the amount given to MSF. This reduction in donations to the humanitarian
project is attributable to the pharmacological effect of alcohol, rather than the placebo effect,
and may signal a lowering attachment to social norms. AWald test cannot reject the null
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hypothesis thatMBAC+MPBAC = 0 from Column 1 to 4 (p> 0.5 in all specifications), as well
as the null hypothesis thatMBACMSF+MPBACMSF = 0 in Column 6 (p = 0.1887). This con-
firms that neither measured nor perceived alcohol intoxication are significant for altruism in
general, and that the specific effect of reducing altruism towards humanitarian causes is due to
measured and not to perceived alcohol intoxication. Treatment dummy regressions confirm
that alcohol intoxication has no significant effect on altruism in general, whether pharmacolog-
ical or placebo (at least once controlling for age and gender), but it has a specific pharmacologi-
cal effect of reducing altruism towards humanitarian causes.
Discussion
In the last two decades, social scientists have devoted substantial effort to studying the behav-
ioral effects of alcohol consumption. In line with the anecdotal evidence, studies generally
Table 7. Alcohol and Altruistic Preferences.
Dependent variable Altruism Altruism Altruism Altruism Altruism Altruism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MBAC -1.8276 -1.8276 -2.0255 -2.0060
(2.4772) (2.4855) (2.3832) (2.3543)
MPBAC -.6253 -.6253 .4831 .4537 .4537
(2.1045) (2.1115) (2.0939) (2.0264) (2.0334)
NO-ALC 2.2787 2.2787 1.6529 1.5002 1.5002 1.5002
(1.4113) (1.4160) (1.3925) (1.4029) (1.4077) (1.4126)
MSF 3.8909*** 3.8909*** 3.8909*** 4.7510*** 5.0087***
(.6440) (.6484) (.6506) (.7990) (.9019)
Age .1669* .1645* .1645* .1645*
(.0965) (.0974) (.0977) (.0980)
Female 2.3391** 2.2824** 2.2824** 2.2824**
(.9573) (.9643) (.9676) (.9710)
WTP .0483 .0483 .0483
(.1058) (.1061) (.1065)
MBAC*MSF -4.7069* -4.7284*
(2.6349) (2.6298)
MBAC*LV .6948 .7163
(2.3644) (2.3879)
MPBAC*MSF -.6126
(2.3856)
MPBAC*LV 1.5200
(2.0336)
Constant 4.9621*** 3.0167*** -1.8183 -1.9131 -2.3431 -2.4720
(1.2570) (1.1699) (2.3748) (2.3330) (2.3331) (2.3515)
Observations 154 154 154 154 154 154
Overall R-Square .0827 .2141 .2765 .2782 .2968 .2991
Notes: Random effect panel estimate. The dependent variable, Altruism, is the donation to two NGOs (Mèdecins Sans Frontiéres and LaVoce, see
Phases 3 and 4 of the experiment), constructed as a longitudinal variable with two observations for each individual. MSF is a dummy for donations to
Mèdecins Sans Frontiéres, and MBAC*MSF and MPBAC*MSF are its interactions with MBAC and MPBAC. The other regressors are defined in the
notes to Table 3. Significance level (***: 1%; **: 5%; *: 10%) based on robust standard errors (reported in parenthesis), clustered at the individual level
(77 clusters).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121530.t007
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support the conclusion that alcohol abuse is positively associated with risk-seeking and impa-
tience. This study contributes to the understanding of the effects of alcohol intoxication (mea-
sured by BAC) on time preferences, risk-taking and altruism. We do so providing causal
evidence gathered by means of a laboratory experiment that substantially reduces self-selection
into the treatment and excludes the possibility that results are driven by reverse causality.
Our results confirm the findings of [16] that males’ risk aversion is not affected by alcohol
intoxication, even using a different elicitation method and in an experimental setting that is de-
signed to control for self-selection. By contrast, we find some evidence that female’s risk aver-
sion increases with alcohol intoxication. We fail to detect a significant impact of alcohol on the
general propensity to donate, although we find a significant reduction in altruism towards hu-
manitarian causes. We also detect a substantial and robust positive relationship between alco-
hol intoxication and impatience, as measured by the amount that subjects require to postpone
the payment to a future date.
Additional observations qualify our experimental findings. First, our results reveal that the
impact of alcohol intoxication on impatience is essentially pharmacological and goes beyond
the expectation-mediated effects. The effect we identify is stronger than what found in other
randomized experiment, while the direction of our results is in line with [39]. We believe that
the stronger and more salient incentives used in our design account, at least in part, for the dif-
ferences between our results and those obtained by other experiments. For instance, [39] use
the Experiential Discounting Task (EDT) to elicit time preferences, where choices are delayed
by a few seconds only and are diluted by a probabilistic component because later rewards are
uncertain. [38], who do not find significant effects of alcohol intoxication, uses a within-subject
design in which the task requires subjects to make more than one hundred decisions between
different combinations of current and delayed rewards. The pay-one-at-random mechanism
used in the mentioned study implies that each decision is made under weak
monetary incentives.
Second, we contribute to the literature on the interplay between risk-taking and time prefer-
ences. The fact that the future is uncertain suggests that the more one dislikes uncertainty, the
more one wants to be compensated not only for facing risk but also for postponing gratifica-
tion. Therefore, a positive correlation between risk aversion and impatience should be ob-
served. On the other hand, impulsivity can be regarded as a general trait that includes both an
inability to delay gratification (impatience) and a tendency to take risks. In this case, we should
expect a positive correlation between impatience and risk taking (this is the typical interpreta-
tion of impulsivity in the psychology literature). The existing evidence is mixed. For instance,
[50] and [38] report that risk aversion increases with impatience, while [51] find opposite re-
sults, a negative and significant correlation between subjects’ degrees of risk aversion and their
(implicit) discount factors. By using data on risk and time preferences at the individual level
and after controlling for the effects of alcohol intoxication, our study reveals the presence of a
significant inverse relationship between impatience and risk aversion. Our results lend support
to [52] who convincingly argue that how individuals discount delayed and probabilistic out-
comes involves different types of impulsivity without being necessarily uncorrelated. In fact,
the correlation we find between risk taking and impatience is in line with the results of [53] re-
ported by [52].
Our results also contribute to a growing field of studies in behavioral economics, which,
building on evidence from both psychology and the neuro-sciences, describes the decision pro-
cess as a compromise between deliberation and emotions. According to dual-self models, the
relative weight of the deliberative and of the emotional selves in decision-making is affected by
an individual’s cognitive load, which reduces the ability to exert willpower and thus shifts the
weight toward the impulsive and emotional self (see for instance [54, 55]. [56] argue that while
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the affective system has initial control, the deliberative system can influence behavior through
the exertion of willpower). If one accepts that alcohol reduces the ability to exert willpower and
self-control, its effects can be interpreted as analogous to those of cognitive load: alcohol intoxi-
cation results in decisions being determined more by emotions and less by deliberation. Ac-
cording to this view, by exploiting an exogenous variation in blood alcohol concentration, our
experiment may shed light on the behavioral implications of the emotional self. It provides
prima facie evidence that the emotional self is, indeed, impulsive and lead by immediate drives
rather than by the calculation of future consequences, thereby inducing individuals to make de-
cisions that they may regret later (partially in line with our results, a recent experimental study
by [57] shows that cognitive load increases both small-stakes risk aversion and short-run
discounting).
It may be useful to point out three directions for future research, that arise from limitations
of the present study. First, replicating the analysis with a larger and more varied sample would
increase the precision of the estimates and the external validity of the results. Second, the aver-
age alcohol intoxication level in our treatment was around 0.6. We conjecture that, at higher in-
toxication levels, alcohol may have an even stronger effect on impatience and a significant
impact on risk aversion, but more evidence is required to validate such conjecture. Third, in
our experiment alcohol intoxication significantly raises impatience through a pharmacological
effect, but overall variations in intoxication explain only a small part of the variance of impa-
tience. Moreover, when we disregard the intensive margin (the degree of intoxication) and sim-
ply exploit the extensive margin (comparing subjects in the treated and in the placebo group),
the significance of the effect of alcohol on impatience drops from 5% to 10%. These aspects of
our results are likely to be a direct consequence of the relatively small sample size and the low
average intoxication levels in ALC-T. Alternatively, they might be due to the fact that the
“true” effect of alcohol on impatience is small. Replication and further experimental studies
across different populations and across different intoxication levels are called for to extend and
deepen our results, check their external validity and get additional insights.
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